The Endangered Species Act: Does "Endangered"
Refer to Species, Private Property Rights, the Act
Itself, or All of the Above?
Diana Kirchheim°
Imagine that your family has owned a 3200-acre ranch in western
Riverside County, California, for five generations. You grow wheat,
oats, and barley. Using standard agricultural practice, you leave a
portion of land unplanted, or fallow, for a year so that the soil has a
chance to rejuvenate, thereby keeping the land in good condition and
increasing future yields.
One day you discover biologists surveying the fallow land on your
ranch. These biologists forward the data collected on your land to the
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The data indicates that a population
of Stephens Kangaroo Rats was found on your farm. The FWS
decides to prohibit your family from plowing the 800 fallow acres so
that the rodents can be studied. It takes the rats three years to traverse
your property. Once the FWS lifts the ban on planting on the fallow
land, your family is out $400,000 in lost income and expenses for
attorneys and biologists. Your family now plants every acre every
year, reducing the land's yield and eliminating all natural habitat for
wildlife, out of fear that the rat will return and the use of your land
will once again be taken from you.
In another scenario, you are a resident once again of Riverside
County in southern California, a region notorious for wildfires.
Unfortunately, the FWS has prevented you from discing1, a procedure

* J.D. Candidate 1999, Seattle University School of Law; Clerk, Supreme Court of
Washington, the Hon. Gerry Alexander, 2000-2001. The author wishes to thank Professor
Richard Settle for his excellent criticisms and suggestions and Bill Pickell for the topic suggestion
and analysis of the current debate. In addition, thank you to the law review editorial committee
for its thoroughness and detailed editing, especially to Brad Buckhalter, Sharon Cates, and
Heather Carr. Last, but definitely not least, thanks Mom and Dad for all your wisdom, love, and
support.
1. "Discing" is a mechanical process whereby an implement, usually pulled and powered
by a tractor, cuts into and overturns the soil. Fire experts believe it to be the most effective
means of fire prevention. Michael Vivoli, Note, "Harm"ingIndividual Liberty: Assessing the U.S.
Supreme Court's Decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 315 n.267 (1996).
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used to dig firebreaks to keep your home safe from wildfires. The
FWS has taken this position because discing would disturb the
burrows of Stephens Kangaroo Rats. You have been applying for
permission to disc your property for over a year. Then a wildfire
strikes. The fire department urges people to disc their property. The
FWS still refuses your requests to disc. When you smell the smoke
nearing your home, do you violate federal law by discing the land
around your home to protect it, or do you allow the fire to destroy it?
Whatever decision you make, the rats will be destroyed.
Unfortunately, these hypotheticals are real-life scenarios. 2 They
happened to property owners under the current Endangered Species
Act (ESA or "the Act").3 In fact, the Kangaroo Rat regulations in
Riverside County, California have made the rat the largest "landowner" in that county.4
It is not only the Stephens Kangaroo Rat that is affecting property
owners. There are many compelling stories from people who have had
to live with the real-life impact of the ESA.' As a result of these
adverse effects on property owners, the ESA has been criticized not
only for being ineffective in preserving species and their ecosystems,
but also for being more expansive than Congress originally envisioned.
In fact, Senator Mark Hatfield, one of the authors of the Act, was
quoted as saying:

2. RICHARD POMBO & JOSEPH FARAH, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: HOW To END THE
WAR ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 46-47 (1996). The first scenario represents the true story of the
Domenigo family and their farm. It is interesting to note that FWS threatened the Domenigo
family with a $50,000 fine and/or a year in prison for each rat disturbed. In addition, the taxes
on the property were never abated. Vivoli, supra note 1, at 315 n.262. The second scenario is
based on the wildfires that struck Southern California in 1993. POMBO & FARRAH, supra this
note, at 46-47. Twenty-nine families in Riverside County lost their homes to the wildfires. Id.
The FWS had in fact prevented the families from digging firebreaks or discing in order to protect
the burrows of Stephens Kangaroo Rats. Id. at 47. Michael Rowe decided to disc his property
against the FWS's wishes and violate the ESA. Id. Yshmael Garcia obeyed the FWS and did
not disc his property. Id. His house burned down and the rats' burrows were destroyed. Id.
Mr. Garcia summed it up best: "My home was destroyed by a bunch of bureaucrats in suits and
so-called environmentalists who say animals are more important than people." POMBO &
FARRAH, supra this note, at 47.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 153 et seq. (1985).
4. BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK 84 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1997) [hereinafter GRIDLOCK].
5. For example, families in Owyhee County, Idaho, cannot get bank loans for their homes
because the listing of a tiny snail, the Bruneau Hot Springs snail, has caused the value of their
property to plummet. In Laramie, Wyoming, the community's mosquito control program has
been suspended because of the ESA, causing severe health risks for Laramie citizens, including
a boy who contracted encephalitis from a mosquito. 143 CONG. REC. S9411-03, S9412 (1996)
(statement of Senator Kempthorne).
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I have supported-and I continue to support-the ESA. ...

But
unlike many of my colleagues from urban areas, I also have to deal
with the human side of this act, and thus[,] have special reason to
know that it has come to be an environmental law that favors
preservation over conservation. There is no question that the act is
being applied in a manner far beyond what any of us envisioned
when we wrote it 20 years ago. . . . The fact is that Congress
always considered the human element as central to the success of the
ESA. The situation has gotten out of control.6
The ESA, as written and applied today, is not reaching the goals
that its drafters envisioned. While the ESA in theory saves species
from extinction and restores them to viable populations, in actuality it
often devastates property owners and arguably results in the recovery
of few species. By shifting the burden of species conservation to
private property owners, the ESA has caused people to fear species
conservation instead of encouraging property owners to become part of
the solution by conserving species on their own property. In an era of
environmental awareness, we all want the same goal: to preserve the
species in our environment. Only by encouraging the states and
citizens of our country to become actively involved in endangered
species conservation and by giving them incentives to implement this
program, will we see a turnaround in the recovery of threatened
species. Therefore, the ESA must be rewritten to restore it to its
original purpose of species conservation without imposing stifling
bureaucratic regulations.
There is no doubt that the ESA was adopted with the utmost
good will. Upon signing the ESA on December 28, 1973, President
Nixon stated, "[n]othing is more priceless and more worthy of
preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our country
has been blessed." '7 This statement defines the ESA's ultimate
purpose, which is to conserve the Nation's natural heritage for the
enjoyment and benefit of current and future generations.' "Conserve"
is defined in the ESA to mean the use of all methods necessary to
bring a protected species to a point where the ESA's protections are no
longer needed.' The Supreme Court found that "[t]he plain intent of

6. DixY LEE RAY & Louis R. Guzzo, ENVIRONMENTAL OVERKILL: WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO COMMON SENSE? 82 (1993).
7. National Marine Fisheries Service Office of Protected Resources (visited 11/2/97)
<http://kingfish.ssp.nmfs.gov/tmcintyr/esahome.html>.
8. Id.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
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Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'"
The ESA is the most comprehensive environmental legislation
Congress has ever passed." Since its adoption, a conflict has arisen
between those who think the ESA is effective in saving endangered
species and those who think it infringes on property rights and often
results in major economic loss in return for minor environmental
gain. 12 This conflict intensified when the ESA came up for renewal
beginning in 1992.13

The future of the ESA is uncertain. Recent attempts by Congress
to reauthorize the ESA have failed." Some have noted that the ESA
has come close to being repealed or becoming extinct itself.' 5 Private
property advocates have promoted several proposals to weaken the
ESA's power upon reauthorization and, in some cases, have advised
repealing the Act itself.'6 Donald Berry, vice president for lands at
the World Wildlife Fund, notes that "if there is one event that causes
the diverse environmental community to hyperventilate in unison, it is
an assault on the ESA."' 7 Environmentalists have apparently felt no
urgency to reauthorize the ESA because it remains operational as long
as money is appropriated for it.18 A recent ruling by the United
States Supreme Court on the ESA has added more fuel to the debate
between private property interests and environmentalists and will be
discussed in a later section of this Comment.
This Comment will focus on the current problems of the ESA and
suggest how the ESA can be rewritten to accommodate both environmental and private property interests. Section I will discuss procedure
under the ESA. In Section II, the Comment examines the controversial "harm" definition frequently arising in ESA litigation. In Section
III, the Comment will dispel the myth that the ESA is currently
operating as originally intended and will discuss the reasons why
10. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
11. Id. at 180.
12. A Bird in the Hand, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 30, 1997, at A20.
13. Laura Spitzberg, The Reauthorizationof the Endangered Species Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 193, 195 (1994).
14. J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for AdministrativeReform of the Endangered
Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 369 (1988).
IS. Protecting the ESA Senate's Endangered Species Act Reauthorization Compromise Won't
Please Everyone, But It's Better Than Actions to Gut the Law, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 30,
1997, at B06 [hereinafter Protecting the ESA].
16. See, e.g., Tanya L. Godfrey, Student Works: The Reauthorization of the Endangered
Species Act: A Hotly Contested Debate, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 979 (1996).
17.

RAY & GuzzO, supra note 6, at 91.

18.

Godfrey, supra note 16, at 980.
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private property owners criticize the current ESA. Section IV will
examine a proposal for reauthorizing the ESA written by Senator Dirk
Kempthorne (R-Idaho) that Congress failed to adopt in 1997.1"
Further, in Section V, the Comment will focus on suggestions for
improving the Kempthorne Reauthorization Bill as the basis for future
legislation geared toward ESA reform and reauthorization. Finally, in
Section VI, this Comment will conclude that the ESA should not be
reauthorized without first being rewritten to ensure a balance between
strong, effective species protection and a genuine respect for property
rights and economic interests.
ESA
The ESA is administered by the Secretaries of the Interior and
Commerce."
Specifically, the FWS is responsible for terrestrial
species, while the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is
responsible for marine species.21
The ESA requires that endangered and threatened species be
identified and that these species, along with their habitats, receive
statutory protection.22 Federal protection for species begins once the
species has been listed in the Federal Register as either threatened or
endangered.23 The decision to list a species as threatened or endangered is thus a key decision.24
At the initiative of the FWS, NMFS, or any interested person, a
species or critical habitat may be proposed for listing or delisting.2"
Once a petition is filed, the agency has ninety days to determine
whether the request presents enough data to support further investigation.26 If there is enough evidence to support further investigation,
I.

PROCEDURE UNDER THE

19. Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997, S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a)(1).
21. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Web Site (visited 8/30/98) <http://www.fws.gov/
rgendspp/esa.sum.html>.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
23. "Endangered species" are those in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of their range, while "threatened species" face a somewhat less imminent prospect of
extinction but are likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6),
1532(20).
24. All decisions to list a species are subject to notice and comment of informal rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act. PATRICK W. RYAN AND GALE SCHULER, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT - A PRIMER (Perkins Coie, LLP 1998). However, judicial review
of those decisions is limited. To successfully challenge a listing, a challenger must demonstrate
that the agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Id. Successful petitions for delisting
a species that has been listed are also rare, despite the fact that the ESA allows delisting. Id.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
26. Id.
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then the agency begins review of the species's status.27 Review must
be completed within a year and the following action must be taken: (1)
rejection of the petition, (2) proposal of a rule to list the species, or (3)
2
extension of time for consideration of the petition for another year. 1
Once a decision is made to propose a rule listing a species, the
agency has another year to make the listing decision after proposal of
the rule. 29 A decision to list a species as endangered or threatened
must be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available .
",30
However, the conservation efforts that are
already in place by state and local programs and regulations may also
be considered.31
The ESA contains three major mechanisms to ensure the
protection and recovery of "endangered" or "threatened" species.
First, the ESA prohibits all international and interstate trade in listed
species.3 2 Second, the ESA prohibits federal agencies from taking any
action that is likely to "jeopardize the continued existence" of any
listed species or likely to result in the "destruction or adverse modification" of any habitat designated as "critical. ' 33 The determination of
whether federal action may jeopardize a species or adversely modify
critical habitat is made through a process called "consultation," in
accordance with Section 7 of the ESA.34 Third, the ESA prohibits

27. Id.
28. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i)-(iii),
29. § 1533(D)(ii).
30. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
32. § 1538(a).
33. § 1536(a)(2)(1988).
34. Whenever an agency action involves a major construction activity, the agency must
request information from the FWS about the presence of listed or proposed species. JACKSON
B. BATTLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: NEPA AND THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 169 (Andersons 2d ed., 1986). If no such species is present, the action is allowed
to proceed. Id. However, if a species is present, then the agency must prepare a biological
assessment to determine whether the species or its critical habitat is likely to be adversely affected
by the proposed action. Id. If a biological assessment concludes that adverse affects are likely,
then the agency must enter into formal consultation with the FWS. For proposed actions that
do not require a biological assessment, agencies must initiate formal consultation if the action may
affect a listed species or critical habitat. Id. After formal consultation concludes, the FWS
prepares a biological opinion, which addresses the extent to which the proposed action is likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of its critical habitat. Id. If no jeopardy will result, the action may proceed. Id.
If no jeopardy will result, but individual members of a listed species might be taken within the
meaning of Section 9 of the ESA, then the FWS may issue an incidental take statement which
protects the agency against Section 9 liability for a stated number of "takes," so long as the agency
employs specified precautionary measures. Id. If the FWS determines that jeopardy will result,
then it must suggest reasonable and prudent alternatives that will not jeopardize the species. Id.
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any person from "taking" any listed animal species, unless the
Secretary has issued a special permit authorizing the "take."3 The
Act broadly defines the term "take" as meaning "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt
to engage in any such conduct."3 6 This broad, controversial definition provides wide-ranging protection for listed animals and will be
further discussed in Section II.
In addition to these mechanisms, the ESA requires the Secretary
of the Interior to develop and implement "recovery plans" for all listed
species, unless the development of such a plan "will not promote the
conservation of the species." 37 Recovery plans must, to the "maximum extent practicable," include: (1) site-specific management actions
to promote conservation; (2) objective, measurable criteria that, when
met, will determine when the species may be removed from the list;
and (3) estimates of the time and money necessary to achieve the plan's
specific goals. 38 Also, recovery plans must be based solely on
biological considerations, not on economic or social factors.39

In addition to protecting individual species of plants and animals,
the ESA emphasizes the need to protect the ecosystems of endangered
and threatened species."g A listed species' habitat, the "critical
habitat," is obviously essential to saving the species from extinction.
Critical habitat is defined as "the specific areas within the geographical
area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed" and even "specific
areas outside the geographical area" if this land is essential for the
species to survive.4 " Under the 1978 amendments to the ESA, when

Generally, actions that may jeopardize a listed species, or that will result in the destruction or
adverse modification of their critical habitat, may not go forward unless an exemption is received.
Id. Congress established a seldom-used process in 1978 to allow agencies to apply for exemptions
from the ESA and to pursue the action. Id.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Under Section 10 of the ESA, any person who proposes an activity
that may "incidentally" result in the "taking" of a listed species may prepare and seek approval
of a habitat conservation plan (HCP). BATTLE ET AL., supra note 34, at 170-71. The HCP must
describe the impact that will likely result from the taking, the steps that will be taken to minimize
and mitigate that impact, the funding that will be available to carry out the mitigation, and the
alternatives to the proposed plan that were considered. Id. The Secretary is required to approve
a permit that authorizes the incidental taking of a listed species if he or she finds that the
applicant will minimize and mitigate the impacts to the maximum extent practical, that adequate
funding is available to carry out the mitigation, and that the taking will not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of survival of the species. Id.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
37. § 1533(0(1).
38. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
39. § 1533(f)(1)(A).
40. § 1531(b).
41. § 1532(5)(A)(i)-(ii).
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a new species is listed, the Secretary of the Interior must designate the
critical habitat to the extent that such designation is prudently
possible.4 2 A balancing test is then used, under which the benefits of
excluding land from the critical habitat are weighed against the benefits
of including the land in the critical habitat.4 3 If the benefits of
excluding the land outweigh the benefits of including it, then a certain
portion of the land will be excluded from the designated critical
habitat.44 However, the Secretary is not to exclude an area if its
exclusion will result in the extinction of a species.4" After the 1978
amendments to the ESA, the Secretary was required to consider
economic impact when designating critical habitat for a listed
species.46 Congress nullified this provision in the 1982 amendments
to the ESA.47

Three courses of action are available to prosecute persons who
violate the ESA.18 First, the government can impose civil penalties
on a violator.49 Second, the government can seek to impose criminal
penalties."0 Third, citizens are granted the right to bring a civil
action in district court.5 " Any person may sue to enjoin an ESA
violation or to compel the Secretary of Interior to enforce the take
prohibition. 12 A citizen may also specifically sue the Secretary for
failure to perform a nondiscretionary act. 3 The ESA further encourages individuals to assist the Secretary in enforcing the Act by
rewarding those persons who provide information leading
to an arrest,
54
a conviction, a penalty, or the forfeiture of property.

42. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). Critical habitats must be designated for all listed species on
the basis of the best scientific data available. § 1533(b)(2).
43. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
44. Id.
45. 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1995).
46. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
47. Godfrey, supra note 16, at 986.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
49. § 1540(a)(1). The ESA can be enforced with civil penalties up to $25,000 for each
violation, subject to defenses. Id.
50. § 1540(b)(1). A person who "knowingly violates" an ESA provision may face criminal
prosecution, resulting in fines up to $50,000 and imprisonment for up to a year. Id.
51. § 1540(g)(1).
52. § 1540(g)(1)(A)-(B).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C).
54. § 1540(d).
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II.

HARM DEFINITION AND RECENT LITIGATION

The most contentious aspect of the ESA for property owners is its
power to take private property through extensive restrictions on land
where endangered species may exist.
As discussed previously, Section 9 of the ESA provides that it "is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
to ... take any [listed] species within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States.""5 As mentioned above, "take"
means to "harm," among other things. The meaning and scope of the
"harm" definition is significant under the ESA because, if a property
owner is found to have harmed a protected species, then the landowner
has taken a species under Section 9 and is subject to fines and possible
imprisonment.5 6 As a result, the interpretation of the term "harm" is
critical to finding that a landowner has violated Section 9 of the ESA.
To further clarify the application of the term "take," the Secretary
of the Interior promulgated a regulation defining the term "harm" as
that used within the take definition of the ESA.7 Currently, "harm"
within the take definition means an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife, including "significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.

''

15

The agency's promulgation of the "harm" regulation has been
very controversial and the subject of much litigation. 9 Several courts
have interpreted the ESA's terms "take" and "harm" differently. The
Supreme Court ruled on the "take" definition in Tennessee Valley Auth.
v. Hill.6" In that case, the Court shut down a billion dollar dam
project in order to protect an endangered breed of perch known as the
snail darter. 6' The Court found that, upon examination of the ESA's
language, history, and structure, Congress intended endangered species
to be afforded the highest of priorities.6" While this case interpreted
Section 7 of the ESA, destruction or adverse modification of the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
v. Sweet

§ 1538(a)(1)(B).
§ 1540(a)(1).
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995).
Id.
See Kelly A. Keenan, Note, They Paved Paradiseand Put Up a Parking Lot: Babbitt
Home, Chapter of Communities for A Great Oregon, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (1997).

60. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id. at 175.
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endangered snail darter's critical habitat was clearly prohibited.
Because Section 9 of the Act does not explicitly prohibit alteration or
loss of critical habitat, the issue arose of whether a "taking" as
prohibited by Section 9 includes harm, degradation, or loss of habitat.
The Ninth Circuit decided the issue in Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of
Land & Natural Resources63 by relying on the strong support that the
Supreme Court gave the ESA in its Hill decision. At the district court
level, the court found that the Palila bird's critical habitat was Hawaii's
mamane forests. Plaintiffs alleged that mouflon sheep, grazing on
public lands and feeding on shoots, seedlings, and bark of the mamane
forest, endangered the Palila bird and constituted an impermissible
taking under the ESA.64 The district court ruled that the habitat
destruction was an impermissible taking because the Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources would foreseeably harm the Palilas
by allowing the sheep to continue to graze and thereby significantly
impair the Palila's ability to feed.65 Despite no actual death or injury
to the Palila, the court still found a violation of the take clause and
ordered the sheep removed from the public lands so that the Palila's
food sources could grow and regenerate. 66
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that
the regulation was consistent with the congressional intent to afford
endangered species the highest priority.67 This case established the
important and controversial precedent of protecting endangered species
even where the habitat modifications that harm the wildlife are
foreseeable, but cause neither actual nor proximate injury or death.6
Another recent case established its own application of the harm
regulation. In Sweet Home, Chapter of Communitiesfor a Great Oregon
v. Lujan, a group of small landowners in the logging industry sought
a declaratory judgment against the Secretary of the Interior and the
Director of the FWS.69 The loggers argued that the application of
the harm regulation to the Northern Spotted Owl and other threatened
wildlife species prevented them from developing all viable uses of their

63. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Pallia v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp, 1070, 1078 (D. Haw.
1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 1080.
66. Id. at 1082.
67. Palla,852 F.2d at 1109 n.6.
68. See Keenan, supra note 59, at 1489.
69. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), affid sub nom. Sweet Home, Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd on rehearing, 17 F.3d 1963 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), aff'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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property because these endangered species occupied their land.7" The
loggers contended that the Secretary acted beyond his authority when
he included habitat modification within the harm regulation." The
Secretary argued that a "harm" occurs only where there is an intentionally-caused, actual, physical injury to a specific member of a listed
The United States District Court for the District of
species."
Columbia rejected the loggers' challenges and found the regulation
valid.73
The loggers appealed the district court's ruling by arguing that
Congress had not intended habitat modification to be equivalent to a
prohibited take.74 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
initially affirmed the lower court, but on rehearing en banc, the panel
reversed its decision and found the Secretary's regulation to be
impermissible.7"
The D.C. Court of Appeals' holding in Sweet Home conflicted
with the Ninth Circuit's holdings in the Palila case and thus caused a
split in the circuits regarding whether the Secretary's interpretation of
the harm definition was reasonable. In Palila,the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a taking exists where there is a foreseeable harm, but did not
require proximate cause between the habitat modification and the
harm.76 On the other hand, the court in Sweet Home ruled that
including habitat modifications that significantly affect feeding,
breeding, and sheltering patterns of endangered species within the
harm regulation was an invalid agency interpretation of the congressional intent regarding the scope of activities included within the take
prohibition.77 Faced with conflicting opinions, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sweet Home to resolve the split.7"
The main issue on appeal was whether the Secretary of the
Interior's interpretation defining "harm" was reasonable. The Supreme
Court held that the congressional intent regarding the ESA was
ambiguous and that the Secretary of Interior reasonably construed the

70. Id. at 283.
71. Id. at 286.
72. Id. at 284.
73. Id. at 287.
74. Sweet Home, Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, I F.3d 1, 3 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), rev'd on rehearing, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), affJd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
75. Sweet Home, Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463,
1472 (D.C. Cir. 1994), [hereinafter Sweet Home III], rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
76. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1110.
77. Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1465-67.
78. Babbitt v. Sweet Home, Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687,
695 (1995) [hereinafter Sweet Home IV].
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intent of Congress when he defined harm to include "significant
habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures
wildlife."7 9 The Court's opinion was based on the ESA's text,
structure, and legislative history.8"
The Court found that the ESA's text offers three justifications for
finding the agency's interpretation reasonable and valid. First, the
plain meaning of harm encompasses habitat modification that results
in actual injury or death to specific endangered species.81 Second, the
ESA's comprehensive purpose supports the Secretary's decision to
extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms that the
statute was enacted to avoid.82 Third, it can be inferred from the
creation of an incidental permit system that the take clause prohibits
indirect as well as direct takes.83
The Supreme Court also found that the ESA's legislative history
reflected the reasonableness of the agency's harm regulation.8 4 First,
the Senate Report stressed that "'take' is defined . . .in the broadest
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person
can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."8" Second, the
definition "would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or
prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those
activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to
hatch or raise their young. '"86 The Court concluded that the congressional intent was to include direct as well as indirect acts within the
take provision, and therefore, it was reasonable for the Secretary to
include habitat modification within the harm regulation.87
The legal ramifications of the Sweet Home IV holding are difficult
to predict because the case failed to draw a bright line between what
constitutes a harm and what does not.88 The degree of causation that
must be shown between the habitat modification and the harm
resulting from that modification is still unanswered.89 While validating the regulation that prohibits acts that proximately and foreseeably

79. Id. at 708.
80. See id. at 697-701.
81. Id. at 697-98.
82. Id. at 698-700.
83. Id. at 700-01.
84. Sweet Home IV, 515 U.S. at 704-08.
85. Id. at 704 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-307 7 (1973)).
86. Id. at 705 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 15 (1973)).
87. Id. at 708.
88. See Keenan, supra note 59, at 1499.
89. See Duana J. Desiderio, Sweet Home on the Range: A Model for As-Applied Challenges
to the "Harm" Regulation, 3 ENVTL. LAW 725, 739 (1997).
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cause significant disruption to essential behavioral patterns, such as
breeding, feeding, and sheltering, is a victory for environmentalists, it
remains unclear which modifications to the critical habitat by
landowners foreseeably and proximately cause death or injury to
endangered species. A significant question is whether a more direct
and proximate nexus must be found to link actual injury to the
challenged habitat alteration.9" One thing is for certain, the ambiguous Sweet Home IV standard has been applied on a case-by-case basis
and provides little guidance to landowners on how they can comply
with the "harm" regulation.9 1
III.

MYTHS ABOUT THE ESA'S SUCCESS

While the courts struggle to interpret the ESA's terms, the Act's
supporters and critics argue over its real-world effects. The ESA's
supporters argue that the Act has successfully protected many species.
They point to major success stories in protecting endangered species. 92 They also suggest that the ESA is the only defense available
against the loss of a species or the destruction of a rare habitat.9" The
ESA's supporters acknowledge the ESA's shortcomings, but claim that
the shortcomings are based on a combination of inadequate funding
and weak enforcement, not on the ESA itself.94
As mentioned above, the ESA defenders also argue that the Act
has rescued many species from certain extinction. For example,
environmental groups tell stories about the ESA rescuing the bald95
eagle, the American alligator, and the brown pelican from extinction.
However, the ESA critics claim that some species should never have
been listed. For example, the 1973 population of 734,000 alligators did
not indicate that it was in danger of extinction.96 Even the National
Wildlife Federation admitted that "[i]t now appears that the animal
97
should never have been placed on the Endangered Species List.
According to the most recent report provided by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, approximately nine percent of our endangered
species are improving in status, twenty-seven percent are stable, thirty-

90. See id.
91. See RYAN & SCHULER, supra note 24, at 7.
92. See POMBO & FARAH supra note 2, at 51.
93. See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 980.
94. See David S. Wilcove, The Promise and the Disappointmentof the EndangeredSpecies Act,
6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J., 275, 277 (1998).
95. POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 51-52.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing National Wilderness Resource at 1, Fall 1994).
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three percent are still declining, and thirty-one percent are of indeterminate status. 98 In addition to the fact that the approximately thirtyeight species added to the list each year stand only a ten percent chance
of improving, contested delistings indicate that the Act has not been
very successful.99 Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, once called
the Act "the most innovative, wide-reaching and successful environ100
mental law that has been passed in the past quarter century.
Babbitt now believes that the ESA should be reformed and that it is
"ripe for reauthorization." '01
The ESA's critics, on the other hand, argue that there are several
reasons why the ESA has been ineffective in protecting species. There
are five main problems with the ESA: (1) the method of listing
species; (2) the protection of species only once they are on their
"deathbeds"; (3) the failure to take into account economic considerations; (4) the fact that decisions under the ESA are not always based
on "good2 science"; and (5) the ESA's effect on private property
0
owners.1
The following discussion examines each of these criticisms in
detail.
A.

Listing of Species

The listing process is time-consuming, expensive, and ineffective.
As mentioned earlier, review of species' status may be initiated either
by the federal government or by a petition from interested parties." 3
This means, in essence, that anyone with a postcard and a stamp can
petition the FWS to list any population of plant, animal, or microorganism under the ESA. Upon receiving a petition, the Secretary has
to decide within twelve months whether to propose the species for
listing.0 4 Whether a species has declined sufficiently to justify
listing is a biological, not an economic, question."' 5 Once a species
has been proposed for listing, the Secretary must publish a notice in
the Federal Register, notify appropriate parties, and schedule a hearing,
if requested by any person. 6 The Secretary must usually make a

98. Wilcove, supra note 94, at 277.
99. Id.
100. See GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 87.
101.

Margaret Kriz, Environment Aimingfor the Green, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Oct. 4, 1997.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 186-88.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
§ 1533(b)(1)(A).
See § 1533(b)(5).
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final decision on listing within one year of publishing the notice, but
decision for up to six months in order to collect
may postpone the
10 7
data.
additional
This lengthy process for listing individual species may have
seemed quite reasonable when the Department of Interior compiled its
original list of seventy-eight endangered species in 1967, but with the
several thousand species currently designated as candidates for listing,
this system no longer makes sense. 108
In addition to being cumbersome, the listing process also is
ineffective. When the ESA was passed in 1973, most members of
Congress assumed that they were voting to protect charismatic species
such as grizzlies, whales, manatees, whooping cranes, and bald
eagles. 0 9 The ESA does protect these types of species, but they are
only a tiny portion of all protected species. Most of the ten to one
hundred million species protected under the current ESA are fungi,
insects, bacteria, and plants, and the ESA is supposed to protect them
all."' Under the ESA, in addition to the listing of any geographically distinct populations of vertebrate species, any species or subspecies
of fish, wildlife, or plants may also be listed."' This is an important
distinction. The ESA can be invoked to protect one subspecies, even
though others may be plentiful, or even overpopulated."'
From a biological perspective, the ESA's focus on protecting
species instead of ecosystems makes little sense. Some scientists now
believe that rather than treating all species equally, the ESA should
give priority to the protection of certain keystone species that play a
vital role in maintaining the health of ecosystems."' It "makes little
sense to rescue a handful of near-extinct species. A more effective
protecting ecosystems that support maximum
strategy would focus' on
4
biological diversity."
The single-species protection has failed to provide adequately for
the conservation of a species and its habitat. During the first twenty
years of its operation, almost all of the activity under the ESA has been
listing species rather than helping them recover."' The ESA autho-

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

§ 1533(b)(6)(A)-(B)(i).
See POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 35.
See GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 83.
Id. at 84.
POMBo & FARAH, supra note 2, at 35.
Id.
See GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 90-92.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 86.
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rizes the Fish and Wildlife Service to create "critical habitat designations" and requires development of recovery plans for species on both
the threatened and the endangered lists. 116 By 1992, however, the
General Accounting Office found that a critical habitat was designated
for just sixteen percent of the species listed and that just sixty-one
percent had a recovery plan in effect.117
B.

ESA Is Being Applied Too Late to Save Species
Almost every author who writes on endangered species reform
calls for earlier conservation efforts than those currently implemented
under in the ESA." 8 The biological and ecological problems of
trying to recover a species that is nearly gone are immense. The
management problems of dealing with a species approaching extinction
also are intensified. Thus, early intervention is key to conserving
species in order to protect entire ecosystems and their interdependent
species.
No authority is given under the ESA to protect species other than
those designated as endangered or threatened." 9 The ESA, therefore,
extends protection to a species only after its numbers are severely
diminished and its very survival is in doubt. This last-minute strategy
is dangerous, especially in terms of habitat conservation. Thus, by
waiting until a species has barely enough habitat to survive, the ESA
may preclude any real hope of recovery. To adequately protect these
species, there must be a trend towards comprehensive protection of
habitats before species are listed. Simply starting conservation before
a species is severely endangered would alleviate much of the pressure,
keep more options open, and reduce conservation costs. In addition,
time limits for drafting recovery plans for endangered species must be
adopted.
C. Ignoring Economic Considerations
As previously mentioned, major decisions under the ESA are
required to be based on science alone, without regard to economic
considerations. 20 Indeed, as also mentioned, the goal of the law is

116. POMBo & FARAH, supra note 2, at 35-36.
117. GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 86.
118. Id. at 91.
119. See Jon Welner, Note, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem
Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319, 329 (1995).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost. 121
In recent years, however, critics have argued forcefully that in
order to produce sound public policy, the ESA must take economic and
social costs into consideration. While proponents of the current ESA
would suggest improving the Act by fully funding and enforcing it, the
cost of fully implementing the Act is staggering."' It has already
cost the United States billions of dollars.123 In fact, conservative
estimates of the ESA's costs are in the tens of billions of dollars.124
In the absence of huge increases in federal spending on endangered
species protection, the combination of enormous costs and very limited
resources creates a clear need to prioritize among species and to weigh
the costs and benefits of protecting one species over another. By not
considering costs, recovery plans cannot ensure that funds are being
spent in a cost-effective manner and that the public is receiving the
maximum amount of species protection for its investment.
Almost everyone would agree that the ESA is a noble law.
However, critics of the ESA argue that the essence of its policy and
implementation requires a balance between strong and effective
ecosystem protection and a respect for economic considerations.12
Congressman William Dannemeyer (R-California) summed it up best
when he said, "[i]f we do not amend this Act to put some balance into
the decision .. . to list one of these critters, this act [sic] has the
'
potential of shutting down the economy of this country."126
D. Effect on Private Property Owners
Critics also argue that the ESA should take into account the
effects of species protection on private landowners. Ike Sugg, the
Competitive Enterprise Institute's fellow in land and wildlife policy,
says that "[t]he current Endangered Species Act is a disaster for both
people and wildlife."' 27 The ESA currently regulates land use
without compensating landowners for their losses. 2 ' Instead, it
places the costs and the burden of species conservation not on society
121. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
122. See GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 82.
123. POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 35.
124. GRIDLOCK, supra note 4, at 84 (citing Ike Sugg, an analyst at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C.).
125. See Ruhl, supra note 14, at 30-71.
126. Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effect on
Man and Prospectsfor Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
127. POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 185.
128. Id.
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as a whole, but on individual property owners. 12 9 By refusing to
provide property owners just compensation when their property is
taken, the ESA gives property owners no incentive to protect endangered species on their land.
The ESA takes precedence over private property rights and
ownership and the multiple-use mandates on federal lands. Although
the government does not literally take private property under the ESA,
the restrictions that the Act places on private property reduce the
property's economic value and, in some cases, make the property
worthless to the private owner. As previously mentioned, it is
unlawful under the ESA for a landowner to modify habitat once a
species is listed. Interfering with that habitat invites fines and jail
sentences. 130
The Act's punitive provisions are criticized by the current ESA's
opponents because the Act provides no rewards or incentives to
encourage good behavior by landowners. 131 Specifically, it does not
encourage landowners to restore or enhance the habitats of endangered
species on their property. 132 In fact, the ESA's critics say that the
Act causes landowners to fear having endangered species discovered on
their property because of the severe regulations restricting the use of
their property.'3 3
Having landowners participate in the process of conserving species
is important for several reasons. First, habitat destruction and
degradation are the leading threats to biodiversity; it is estimated that
they help endanger eighty-eight percent of the plants and animals on
the endangered species list.'34 Second, most of the endangered
species' habitats are found on private land. 31 In 1993, the Nature
Conservancy estimated that almost two-thirds of endangered species
inhabited private property. In some states, more than eighty percent
of the habitat for listed and recommended listed species is privately
owned. 136 No responsible person is opposed to protecting the truly
endangered species. Protection provides a significant public benefit.
The rights of property owners, however, do not need to be sacrificed

129. Id. at 186.
130. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1).
131. See Wilcove, supra note 94, at 277.
132. See id.
133. See POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 187.
134. Wilcove, supra note 94, at 277.
135. Id.
136. National Center for Policy Analysis (visited 10/29/98) <http://www.ncpa.org/ba/
ba166.html>.
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to protect endangered species. Conservation need not be an "either-or"
debate.
E. Lack of Good Science
As mentioned earlier, decisions to list species under the ESA must
be based solely on the best scientific and commercial information
available.137 The current ESA's opponents argue that the decisions
in these areas are based on poor science or no science at all. 3 ' Some
even complain that the listing decisions under the ESA are based as
much on politics as on science.'39
It is possible for the FWS to use the best available data, but only
if someone sends it to them. 4 ' The FWS officials are criticized as
accepting a lot of claims at face value. One example is the Mexican
As a result of
duck, which the FWS granted federal protection.'
this protection, the Vaca family ranch in Arizona lost 200 acres from
its grazing permit. 42 Later, it was discovered that there is no such
thing as a Mexican duck. 143 The birds on the Vaca family ranch
were mallards, perfectly common ducks.'4 4

Critics of the ESA suggest that the ESA must clearly define what
is meant by the term "best available scientific and commercial
data.""'4 5 Not all data is relevant or even rises to the lowest threshold
of being evidence. 4 6 Data claimed to be scientific must be derived
from the use of accepted scientific methods and protocols.'47 Blind
peer review should be instituted to review all data and analyses.
Qualified experts should also be retained to review the information and
should have no financial ties to the FWS. In addition, the blind peer
review should be published so that it is available to the public.
This section was intended to educate the reader on the main
arguments proposed by both sides on the ESA's effectiveness. The

137. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(1)(A).
138. See, e.g., Slade Gorton, Endangered Species: After 20 Years, It's "In Dire Need of
Reform," ROLL CALL, July 25, 1994.
139. See Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993,
at 89, 93.
140. See POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 52.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See POMBO & FARAH, supra note 2, at 187.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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next section will specifically examine these arguments and counterarguments in detail, taking into account the ESA reform.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REAUTHORIZING THE

ESA

This Comment has examined the criticisms of the current ESA
and now turns to suggestions to make the ESA more effective at
protecting species. Several ESA sections need to be amended or
rewritten to effectuate the ESA's purpose and objectives. Any solution
should take into consideration the Endangered Species Recovery Act
of 1997, a recent, unsuccessful legislative proposal by Senator Dirk
Kempthorne (R-Idaho). 148 The Bill was written after nearly two
years of heated negotiations between Kempthorne, who chairs the
Drinking Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife Subcommittee, and three
Senate environmental leaders from the same committee: committee
chairman, John H. Chafee (R-Rhode Island); committee ranking
Democrat, Max Baucus of Montana; and subcommittee ranking
Democrat, Harry M. Reid of Nevada. 4 9 "The result of efforts in the
Senate is legislation that has been carefully crafted to maintain the
essential strengths of the current law while taking steps to make it
work better for species conservation, the States, and affected landown150
ers."
Senator Kempthorne's Bill had three fundamental goals: first, to
maintain and improve conservation of endangered and threatened
species; second, to improve and expedite recovery of those species; and
third, to reduce the regulatory burden on, and uncertainty for, property
owners.'3 ' Despite the Bill's bipartisan approval and backing from
both the Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, and President
Clinton, Congress failed to enact the Bill into law." 2 The Bill
initially passed out of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee by a vote of 15 to 3.13 Reports indicated that while the

Bill was not ideal, it was a reasonable compromise and merited wider
support."5 4 Because Congress did not pass the Bill during the 1997

148.

149.
Senate ..

S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).

See Margaret Kriz, It Was a Kodak Moment Last Month at the Often-Quarrelsome

, NATIONAL

JOURNAL, Oct. 4, 1997.

US FWS: Testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director of the US FWS Before the
Senate Committee, M2 Presswire, Sept. 26, 1997.
151. See 143 Cong. Rec. S9411.
152. See White House Signals Support for ESA Compromise Plan, CONGRESS DAILY, Sept.
30, 1997.
153. See Jim Barnett, Wyden Backs Endangered Species Act Bill, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Oct. 1, 1997, at A07.
154. See A Bird in the Hand, supra note 12.
150.
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or 1998 legislative sessions, the debate over the ESA will continue.
There are those who feel that the Kempthorne Bill represented the only
As a result, the
opportunity for rewriting the ESA until 2001.'
ESA will continue to be a target for property rights advocates and will
continue to ineffectively protect species.
This section of the Comment will focus on the Kempthorne Bill's
strengths, taking into consideration both private property owners'
concerns and environmental concerns, as well as the Bill's weaknesses
that should be corrected in future ESA reform legislation. While
Senator Kempthorne's proposal has seven parts, this Comment will
focus on the following four parts: (1) listing and delisting species; (2)
recovery plans; (3) habitat conservation plans; and (4) authorization for
Finally, this author will conclude that Senator
appropriations.
Kempthorne's Bill was a sound piece of legislation containing few
impositions on private property owners. In essence, the Bill represented a good compromise between two battling sides, and it is disappointing that this moderate proposal was not enacted into law.
A.

Listing and Delisting Species

1. Collection and Use of Scientific Data
Senator Kempthorne's proposal attempted to eliminate some of the
current problems of listing species mentioned above. First, in regards
to the collection and use of scientific data, the proposal required the
Secretary of the Interior to use the best scientific and commercial data
available and to give greater weight to scientific or commercial data
that is empirical, field-tested, or peer reviewed.' 56 Second, it required the Secretary to publish a summary of the best scientific and
commercial data available in the listing proposal.'57 Third, the Bill
required the Secretary to (1) identify and publish in the Federal
Register a description of additional scientific and commercial data that
would assist in the recovery plan preparation, and (2) invite any person
to submit information to the Secretary.'58
The Bill's provisions recognized that, in order to improve the
listing process, decisions must be based on current, factual information.
To enhance public confidence in the listing process, the Bill placed
greater emphasis on the use of good science and public participation.

155.
156.
157.
158.

See Kriz, supra note 149.
S. 1180, § 2(a)(2).
§ 2(c)(8)(A).
§ 2(c)(9)(A).
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Establishing independent, scientific review of listing decisions and
setting specific targets for recovery, which would indicate when a
listing should end, could lead to greater accountability and credibility
in listing decisions, thereby restoring public confidence. Currently
there is so much scientific disagreement surrounding actions and
decisions taken by state and federal agencies that the public is
beginning to distrust results.' 59 Critics of the current ESA feel that
listing decisions are often made based on questionable science and
politics. 160

This section of the Bill was not without criticism. One controversial portion of it was a provision that allowed the Secretary, and any
other federal agency head, to withhold or limit the availability of data
requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) if the data
described an endangered or threatened species' location, or that of a
species proposed for listing, and the data's release would be likely to
result in an increased "take" of the species.16 ' Private property
owners were concerned that they would be denied access to information
gathered from their own land. On the other hand, environmentalists
worried that if a species had not yet been, but could be, listed, the
property owner would take action that could be detrimental to an
endangered species before the listing, thereby avoiding prosecution
under the ESA.
2. Peer Review
The Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997 would have made
peer review for all listing and delisting decisions mandatory. 6 2 The
Bill established a peer review panel to aid in listing and delisting
decisions.' 63 The panel would have included three independent
"referees," chosen from a list provided by the National Academy of
Sciences, who have demonstrated scientific expertise in the relevant
subject area, who do not have a personal conflict, and who are not
64
participants in other, ongoing listing processes.
The Bill's incorporation of peer review recognized the importance
of sound science. Currently, there is no requirement under the ESA
for independent peer review.
Critics, however, suggested that
requiring the National Academy of Sciences to produce a list from
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Protecting the ESA, supra note 15.
(visited 10/29/98) <http://www.nesarc.org>.
S. 1180 § 2(d)(2).
§ 2(c)(10)(A).
Id.
§ 2(c)(10)(B)(i)-(iii).
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which qualified experts are chosen is unnecessary and potentially costly
and burdensome. 6 ' Finally, the Bill required the Secretary to
provide the person who requested the independent review with a
justification for the Secretary's decision regarding listing or delisting
and for any failure to follow a peer review panel majority's recommendation.' 66
A reformed ESA should include some means for interested
persons to intervene in the peer review process. For example, future
legislation would be improved if the Bill required peer reviewers to
respond to comments submitted by the public on the data's sufficiency.
Another possibility for ESA reform is to require that the peer review
panel's findings be made available to the public.
3.

Petition Documentation and Process

The Bill established minimum scientific requirements for petitions
to list, delist, or change the status of a species. A petition to list a
species under the Bill presented substantial scientific or commercial
information if it included: (1) documentation that the fish, wildlife, or
plant is a species as defined by the Act; (2) a description of the
available data on the historical and current range and distribution of
the species; (3) an appraisal of the available data on the status and
trends of all existent populations; (4) an appraisal of the available data
on the threats to the species; and (5) identification of the data that has
been peer-reviewed.' 6 7 The Bill required substantially more information to list a species than the current ESA.
Recognizing that endangered and threatened species are often
treated the same under the current ESA despite their different legal
statuses, the Kempthorne Bill enhanced the distinction between the two
by requiring a "special rule" under Section 4(d) of the ESA for species
listed as "threatened in the future" by no later than thirty months after
the listing decision is made.'68 This would have allowed the Secretary to provide greater management flexibility for threatened species.
The Bill also would have required the Secretary to initiate the
procedures for determining whether to delist a species once the
recovery goal for the species had been met."9 Currently, delisting

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See US FWS: Testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, supra note 150.
S. 1180 § 2(c)(10)(c)(ii).
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decisions are often delayed, and the ESA's enforcement continues
despite the fact that the species no longer needs protection.
The Bill also recognized that states should have a greater role in
the listing and recovery of species. Under the current ESA, states are
not included in the listing process even though the species are located
within that state. Under the Bill, the Secretary would send listing
petitions within ninety days to any affected state and solicit its opinion
as to whether the action is warranted.17 ° The Secretary would also
notify any affected state when considering whether to list a species
without a petition.17 ' While the Secretary must consider the State's
judgment, the proposed language would not have obligated the
Secretary to follow it.'72 Currently, the Secretary can ignore a state's
recommendation without explanation.'
Future legislation should
require at least that the Secretary address why he or she is acting
against the particular state's recommendation.
One way to improve this area of the Bill would be to provide
greater notice to affected landowners. Because most people affected by
the ESA do not read the Federal Register, future attempts to reform
the ESA should include a provision that establishes an early warning
system to allow interested persons to get involved in the listing process.
Notice could be expanded to include the governor of the affected state
or states, county officials, and any interested party that has requested
such notice.
B. Recovery Plans
The primary goal of the ESA is the recovery of endangered and
threatened species. However, as previously mentioned, many of the
endangered species protected under the current ESA do not have
written recovery plans. Those plans that do exist often are not
implemented, thereby sparking criticism that the current ESA is only
concerned with listing species, not saving them. The Kempthorne Bill
would have strengthened the recovery planning and implementation
process significantly by more clearly focusing the ESA on saving
species and removing them from the endangered species list. The Bill
proposed to reach that goal in part by imposing deadlines for the
development of draft and final recovery plans. Under the proposed
legislation, the Secretary would have been required to publish a draft

170.
171.
172.
173.

§ 2(c)(4)(iii)(I).
§ 2(c)(4)(iii)(II).
§ 2(c)(4)(iii)(III).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B).
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recovery plan within eighteen months of a listing and a final plan
within thirty months. 74 This would have been accomplished by
appointing a recovery team, in cooperation with the affected state or
states, within sixty days of a species's final listing. 7 ' Recovery team
members would be selected for their knowledge of the species or for
their expertise in recovery plan design.'76
The Kempthorne Bill would have further promoted state
involvement by requiring each recovery team to include: at least one
state agency representative; representatives from federal, local, and
tribal governments; representatives from academic institutions and
commercial enterprises; as well as private individuals and organizations. 7 Under the Bill, the Secretary would have the authority to
authorize a state agency to develop recovery plans.' 78 Under this
provision, a qualified state agency would appoint the recovery team
and submit the draft recovery plan to the Secretary for approval.
The Bill also established minimum requirements for the contents
of recovery plans. First, the recovery team would have been required
to establish a biological recovery goal, based on the best scientific and
commercial data available, that would result in delisting' 79 Draft
plans also would contain alternative strategies and objectives, measurable benchmarks to achieve the recovery goals, a description of the data
used to develop the plan, and any additional data necessary along with
a strategy to obtain that data."' Currently, recovery plans are not
81
required to contain alternative measures for recovery or their costs.
The recovery measures would have been required to achieve an
appropriate balance between (1) effectiveness, (2) efficiency, and (3)
social and economic impacts.'8 2 If the recovery measures identified
would impose "significant costs" on a municipality, region, county, or
industry, then the recovery team would be required to prepare a
description of the overall economic effect on the private and public
sectors, including a description of the impact on employment, public
revenues, and property values. 3

174. S. 1180 § 3(c)(1), (2).
175. § 3(d)(1).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. § 3(b)(5)(A).
179. § 3(e)(1)(A).
180. S. 1180 § 3(e)(2)(B)(ii).
181. § 3(e)(B)(i)(I)-(III).
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Under the Bill, the Secretary of the Interior would have been
required to publish a notice of availability, a summary of each recovery
plan, and a request for public comment in the Federal Register and in
a local newspaper.'84 The Federal Register notice would be required
to include a description of the economic effects and the recommendations of the independent referees on the recovery goal.'
Also, at the
request of any person, the Secretary would have been required to hold
at least one public hearing in each affected state and up to five public
hearings on draft plans in affected states. 86 After notice and an
opportunity for public comment, the Secretary would have retained the
authority to approve the final recovery plan. 7 Another provision of
the Bill held that if the Secretary selected a recovery plan contrary to
those recommended by the recovery team, then the Secretary would
explain why the recommendation was not followed.'
With regard to critical habitats, the Secretary is currently required
to designate a critical habitat at the time that a species is listed.'89
The Secretary, however, often does not have sufficient information to
designate a critical habitat. Under current practice, critical habitat is
rarely designated at the time of listing, if it is designated at all. The
Kempthorne Bill would have revised the current requirement to allow
the Secretary to publish a final critical habitat designation thirty
months after listing along with the final recovery plan. 9 ° This
would have allowed the Secretary to take advantage of the recovery
team's expertise and recommendations.
C. Habitat Conservation Plans
The Kempthorne Bill would have benefited landowners because
it required conservation plans to include a "no surprises" provision. 19' Additionally, it would have made significant changes to
conservation plans. First, it would have authorized private landowners
to develop habitat conservation plans for multiple, rather than single,
species that depend on the same habitat.'9 2 This would have considered the needs of several species at once and provided certainty to

184.

§ 3(f)(1).

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

S. 1180 § 3(0(2).
§ 3(h)(1).
§ 3(h)(3).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
S. 1180 § 3(n)(2)(A)(ii).
§ 5(c)(5).
§ 5(d)(2)(K).
§ 5(d)(2)(K)(4).
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landowners. The Bill also guaranteed landowners, who develop habitat
conservation plans and who receive incidental take permits, that they
will not be required to spend more money or to carry out additional
mitigation measures to meet future requirements under the ESA for
species covered by their plans.'93 This is accomplished by "safe
harbor" agreements, which encourage landowners to enter into
voluntary agreements with the Secretary that benefit conservation.
Incidentally, a "no surprises" provision has already been administratively implemented by Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt.
The Kempthorne proposal also would have provided more
certainty through "no take agreements," authorizing the Secretary to
enter into agreements with property owners at the property owner's
request to identify activities that would not result in a prohibited take
of an endangered or threatened species.'9 4 Currently, there is no
such provision in the ESA. Second, to minimize the cost to small
landowners, the legislation required the Secretary, in cooperation with
state agencies, to develop a model permit application that could serve
as the conservation plan.' 9
Kempthorne's Bill also established the Habitat Conservation
Planning Fund, from which the Secretary may make interest-free
advances to states and other political subdivisions to assist in the
development of conservation plans. 96 It required advances to be
repaid within ten years if no conservation plan were developed or no
permit for incidental taking were issued.'97
D. Appropriations
The ESA must be adequately funded to assure its effectiveness.
The Kempthorne Bill extended the authorization of appropriations to
carry out the ESA through fiscal year 2003.98 The costs would have
been around $150 million a year, compared to current annual spending
of $75 million.'99 There were concerns, however, over where this
money would come from. Securing adequate funding to support this
legislation was key. Jamie R. Clark, Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, was quoted as saying, "Without adequate appropria-

193. § 5(0.
194. S. 1180 § 5(0(1).
195. See § 5(j).
196. See § 5(h).
197. See § 5(h)(7)(c)(i).

198. § 8.

199. See Senate Bill May Be Best Hope for ESA Reauthorization This Congress, FEDERAL
LANDS, Sept. 22, 1997, at 15.
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tions, we will face significant litigation backlogs, and some species's
20
recovery may be stalled.
V.

SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE KEMPTHORNE
REAUTHORIZATION BILL

A.

Harm Definition

Property advocates have criticized the "harm" definition under the
Kempthorne Bill as being too broadly worded because it does not
require proof of death or injury to the species. 2 1 In addition, the
uncertainty over what constitutes harm results in insufficient guidance
for landowners in complying with the ESA. Some of these individuals
would probably support eliminating "harm" from the definition of
take, thereby requiring a direct and intentional action. Senator
Kempthorne's Bill, however, failed to eliminate the term "harm" from
the take definition. Nevertheless, it did require either the Secretary or
the Attorney General to establish, using scientifically valid principles,
that (1) acts of such person caused or will cause the take, and (2) the
person charged with the alleged violation knowingly engaged in the
activity that resulted in the violation or take of a listed species.20 2
The Bill also allowed private individuals to request the Secretary to
determine within ninety days whether an activity will result in a
prohibited take of the species. 2 3 This provision would have created
consistency and, hopefully, would have side-stepped litigation, as this
is the section of the ESA most likely to spawn litigation.
Alternatively, in future ESA reform legislation, Congress should
require the death of a certain percentage of an endangered species in
a specific geographical area before the actions of private landowners are
considered an impermissible taking. This requirement would prioritize
the interests of the property owner in developing all viable uses of the
land and the economic benefits attached to those uses.
Additionally, the definition of "critical habitat" should be
amended to include the entire area that can be occupied by the
endangered species and the area occupied by species that are dependent
upon the endangered species for survival. This shift would protect
entire ecosystems, rather than single listed species. However, private
property rights advocates would probably concede to this only if

200. US FWS: Testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, supra note 150.
201. See Liberty Matters, Action Alert, Oct. 16, 1997.
202. S. 1180 § 6(a).
203. § 6(b).
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landowners would be compensated by tax credits, government
subsidies, or direct compensation when a critical habitat designation
halts development.
Compensationfor Private Property Owners
Many critics of Senator Kempthorne's Bill point to the fact that
it does not provide just compensation for takings under the ESA.20 4
Many others feel that if compensation were incorporated into the Bill,
Some would concede,
it would be too controversial to pass.2"s
however, that compromise is necessary.
Although legislation designed to protect the environment has
existed for many years, the ESA has created the most visible and
serious conflicts with property rights. Generally, the ESA has little
impact upon private property rights until a species is listed for
protection purposes.
The ESA contains two principal prohibitions that have the
potential to severely restrict the exercise of property rights. First, it
prohibits any person from "taking" any endangered species of fish,
wildlife, or plants.2 °6 Second, it prohibits a federal agency from
engaging in any activity (including issuing permits or licenses, or
funding of private projects) that jeopardizes the endangered or
threatened species' continued existence or critical habitat. 0 7
The ESA should protect property rights. It should recognize that
the goal of species preservation is to benefit society and, therefore,
society rather than private landowners should bear the cost. Burdening
private property owners who have endangered species on their property
by making them bear the cost of conservation fosters fear of the ESA's
provisions, not cooperation with its principles. Unfortunately, it is not
easy to draft compensation language for the ESA.
The problem with drafting compensation language lies in
determining where the line should be drawn and what diminution of
value in land should be compensated. Congressman Pombo (RCalifornia) previously introduced a bill that provided compensation for
private property owners when the ESA-imposed restrictions diminished
the value of their land by twenty percent or more.20 8 He felt that, by
B.

204. See ESA Reform Bill Includes Property Compensation Clause, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
Sept. 17, 1997.
205. See id.
206. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B).
207. § 1536(a)(2).
208.

POMBO & FARRAH, supra note 2, at 188.
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doing this, landowners would no longer fear having endangered species
20 9
on their property.
Realistically, compensation language will probably never be
included in ESA reform because of its controversial nature. If this is
the case, then Congress should enact legislation that would make it
easier for private property owners to vindicate their rights by bringing
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings cases.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that there will be just compensation when the government takes private property.210 A governmental taking of private property occurs when government action either
directly interferes with or substantially disturbs an owner's use and
211
enjoyment of his property.
One type of taking involves what is characterized as a "physical
invasion" of property. 212 This can occur when either government
employees or private individuals acting on behalf of the government
occupy private property. When a physical invasion occurs, it 2is1 3 a
taking regardless of the invasion's economic impact on the owner.
The government can also take private property by restricting use
of the property if that restriction results in a substantial diminution of
the property's value.214 Under the ESA, the government can severely
restrict the use of private property if an endangered species exists on
the property. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether such
land use restrictions rise to the level of a governmental taking.
Senator Kempthorne introduced separate legislation providing tax
incentives for landowners to protect species on their property.
Included in this separate bill was a provision prohibiting federal actions
that reduce the value of a landowner's property by thirty percent or
more, unless compensation is offered.215
While state and federal constitutional provisions may make
compensation language unnecessary, private property advocates wish
to have compensation language added to the ESA because of the
difficulty in getting a regulatory takings case to court. Receiving
compensation under the Fifth Amendment is easier in theory than in

209. See id.
210. U.S. Const. amend V (stating "... nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
211. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 435.
214. See id.
215. ESA Reform Bill Includes Property Compensation Clause, CONGRESS DAILY, Sept. 17,
1997. Evidently, Kempthorne tried unsuccessfully to get this language incorporated into the final
bill, but felt optimistic this language could later be added as an amendment. Id.
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practice.216 The situation is simple: compromise must be made on
both sides. Without the compensation language, however, the Bill was
still sound because the Fifth Amendment should protect private
property rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ESA's goals are undeniably noble. However, the ESA must
be comprehensively rewritten to restore its original purpose. The
current ESA places the immense burden of pursuing this goal on
isolated private landowners whose property happens to harbor listed
species. This is not necessary in an era of environmental awareness.
We need to focus on an ESA that results in a partnership with
landowners to aid in protecting species. The current ESA has been
driven not by conservation efforts, but by the courts and special
interest groups.
Reforming the ESA now is essential because it is applying more
than ever to urbanites. For example, the reach of the ESA is about to
be extended to affect urbanites because chinook and chum salmon in
the Puget Sound region may soon be listed as threatened species. The
proposed listing is the first in the nation for an urbanized surrounding.
It includes fourteen highly populated counties in the Puget Sound
Area.

217

To remedy current and future problems with the current ESA,
real reform must be pursued and adopted now. Senator Kempthorne's
proposal represented a good compromise between environmentalists
and landowners. In his presentation of the Bill to Congress, Senator
Kempthorne said it "will bring real and fundamental reform to the
ESA, and it will minimize the social and economic impact of the ESA
on the lives of ordinary citizens, and it will benefit species."2'18 The
Bill seemed to bring property owners and environmentalists together
to achieve a common goal: successful species conservation and
alleviation of some of the stifling bureaucratic controls over property

216. See Kriz, supra note 149.
217. The impact of this listing, unlike the listing of the spotted owl, has the potential to
affect all residents. The result of protecting the salmon could send power, water, and sewer bills
soaring and severely restrict construction and development. Thus, salmon listing could slow the
growth of the state's economy and drive taxes higher. Agency Proposes Protection for Chinook
Populations, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 26, 1998, at C4. Local and state governments, as
well as local business leaders, are working together to draft a salmon recovery plan so that they
are not forced to have federal agencies and judges decide the appropriate plan for saving salmon
in an area with which they are unfamiliar.
218. 143 Cong. Rec. 59411-03 (statement of Representative Kempthorne).
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owners. Although the Kempthorne Bill did not have enough support
to be enacted, future legislation to reform the ESA would be wise to
build upon the Bill's strengths and weaknesses. Unfortunately, until
ESA reform is implemented, the debate over the effectiveness of the
ESA will continue and the endangered species and landowners will
continue to lose.

